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n his recent book, Age of Anger, Pankaj Mishra considers the un-
coordinated bursts of violence that have punctuated the world since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall as tangible manifestations of the latest wave of 
crisis in liberal modernity. Rather than fostering peace and prosperity 
across the globe, he argues, the economic globalization of the last half 
century has created a claustrophobic and unequal world populated by 
frustrated individuals prone to anger and revenge. ‘The result is, as Hannah 
Arendt feared, “a tremendous increase in mutual hatred and a somewhat 
universal irritability of everybody against everybody else”, or ressentiment, 
[…] an existential resentment of other people’s being, caused by an intense 
mix of envy and sense of humiliation and powerlessness’.1  Resentment 
was recently defined as the dominant mood of our age. More and more 
often, according to commentators such as Marco Belpoliti, individuals feel a 
sense of animosity towards others, towards the world in general, that stems 
from a wrong, offence, affront or frustration which the individual has or has 
perceived to have suffered.2 
Beyond resentment, Peter Sloterdijk wrote of the recent return of another 
forgotten thymotic element, namely rage.3 After decades of suppression or 
attempted transcendence, the ongoing economic crisis and recrudescence 
of global terrorism have demonstrated the centrality of rage as well as its 
potential role in revolutions and emancipatory political struggles. Martha 
Nussbaum has also agreed that anger has once again become not just 
ubiquitous but also ‘popular’. Yet, she is much less convinced that negative 
emotions such as resentment and rage have a role to play in democratic 
politics – in fact, Nussbaum’s work is emblematic in stigmatising these 
feelings as normatively problematic and politically pernicious.4 Concerning 
resentment, in particular, Nussbaum argues that this sentiment is not only 
corrosive of human relationships, but detrimental, on a collective and 
political scale, to civic compassion and social order.5
Are we truly living in an age of resentment? And where does this negative 
emotion sit within René Girard’s mimetic theory? In this paper I will argue, 
firstly, that resentment emerges as an important affect within mimetic 
theory, one intimately linked to Girard’s understanding of the triangular 
nature of desire and the perversely imitative dynamics sitting at its heart. 
Girard’s reading of resentment does indeed illuminate aspects of our global 
modern condition. However, I will also argue that Girard’s conceptualisation 
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2of resentment is somewhat narrow when it collapses resentment into 
ressentiment. In so doing, it not only obscures alternative generative 
mechanisms of resentment whose imitative import is limited, but it also 
negates the political value of resentment. Resentment can stem not only 
from highly mimetic forms of identifications, but can emerge as something 
other than the mere operations of envy and mimetic rivalry. Not all 
resentment, in other words, is about ressentiment. As I argue below, this 
matters not only in conceptual and theoretical terms, but also in political 
terms – the way in which one escapes or transcends resentment is different 
depending on whether this is a mimetic or anti-mimetic sentiment.
The place of resentment in mimetic theory
As an approach that grapples with the entanglements of desire, Réne 
Girard’s mimetic theory is deeply invested in affect and emotions, 
particularly those linked to the often conflictual and rivalrous nature of the 
mimetic condition. As Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Paul Dumouchel and Jean-
Michel Oghourlian have illustrated, envy and jealousy feature in Girard’s 
conceptual palimpsest only subtly and yet they arguably they form its 
ubiquitous affective underpinnings.6 The same could be said about 
resentment. Rather than a purely psychological, individual disposition – and 
just like envy and jealousy – resentment is the relational expression of a 
mode of desiring that is central to Girard’s understanding of the mimetic 
condition. After a brief illustration of the place of resentment in Girard’s 
triangular model of desire, this section will investigate the equation of 
resentment and ressentiment which emerges from Girard’s writings due to, 
on the one hand, the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler, and 
on the other Girard’s own conservative inclinations. I will argue that Girard 
deliberately conceptualises only one route into resentment, and that is 
envy, which leads him to collapse the difference between resentment and 
ressentiment. This, however, eclipses other processes and forms of 
identification able to generate modalities of resentment that are other than 
ressentiment – the next section will explain why this distinction matters.
The fundamental insight behind Girard’s mimetic theory is that humans are 
mimetic animals, born with a fundamental openness and permeability to the 
Other. As imitative creatures, humans are driven by a tendency to imitation 
in many different ways and areas, but the most fundamental form of 
imitation is that which relates to desires, namely what we want. Drawing on 
Jacques Lacan, Girard states that human beings are animals that desire, 
but do not know what to desire: ‘the reason is that he (sic) desires being, 
something he himself lacks and which some other person seems to 
possess’.7 For this reason, individuals borrow their desires from the Other: 
our desires, then, are always mediated by the Other. According to Girard, 
our subjectivity and autonomy, if one can still use terms that reveal 
3themselves to be problematic under the mimetic magnifying lens, emerge 
only through a complex matrix of imitative dynamics of which we are often 
unaware. Further, while we learn what to desire from Others, certain 
‘Others’ are more important and formative than other ‘Others’. To those 
‘significant others’, Girard gives the name of models: ‘[w]e assume that 
desire is objective or subjective, but in reality it rests on a third party who 
gives value to the objects. The third party is usually the one who is closest, 
the neighbour’.8 
Rather than dyadic or monistic, according to Girard, therefore, the 
fundamental structure of human relationships is triangular – connecting 
subjects, models and their mimetic object of desire in intimate ways. This 
triangular dynamic ends up complicating the neat relationship between self 
and Other considerably, to the point of nesting a huge potential for violence 
in every significant relationship. As Girard explains, ‘If individuals tend to 
desire what their neighbours possess, or to desire what their neighbours 
even simply desire, this means that rivalry exists at the very heart of human 
relations’.9 Love and admiration for our models can quickly turn into 
bitterness and rancour precisely because what they are, and what they 
desire, is necessarily also what we want. ‘The positive feelings resulting 
from the first identification—imitation, admiration, veneration—are fated to 
change into negative sentiments: despair, guilt, resentment’.10 Imitation 
shows its rivalrous and conflictual side when it manifests itself in its 
acquisitive, appropriative incarnation – when it structurally sets individuals 
on a collision course over the same object over which their desires 
mimetically converge.  
Two implications follow from this state of affairs. Firstly, the genesis of 
violence in mimetic theory has nothing to do with scarcity, egoism or self-
affirmation, but it is merely processual. Violence is created by the mimetic 
entanglements of self and other: ‘violence is generated by this process, or 
rather violence is the process itself when two or more partners try to 
prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire through 
physical or other means’.11 Secondly, from an affective point of view, the 
process of double mediation and rivalry taking place between self and 
model leaves both subjects experiencing a range of negative emotions 
which escalate as the possibility of imitating / acquiring what the other is or 
has is thwarted. Resentment is the affect that dominates this particular 
phase of mimesis. 
According to Girard, resentment is ‘what the imitator feels about his model 
when the model hinders his efforts to gain possession of the object on 
which they both converge’.12 As every attempt is frustrated and thwarted, 
the imitator quickly becomes obsessed not with the final object of desire, 
but rather with the model-turned-obstacle. Every time the imitator bumps 
against a model-turned-obstacle, however, their thirst for power and 
metaphysical desire to be, or fuse with, the model increase. Their 
4sentiments, defeated, bounce back as re-sentment. Resentment is thus the 
feeling most closely associated with the double-bind of mimetic desire. 
‘Whenever the disciple borrows from his (sic) model what he believes to be 
the “true” object, he tries to possess that truth by desiring precisely what 
this model desires. Whenever he sees himself closest to the supreme goal, 
he comes into violent conflict with a rival. By a mental shortcut that is both 
eminently logical and self-defeating, he convinces himself that the violence 
itself is the most distinctive attribute of this supreme goal!’.13 
There is something both deeply ambivalent and masochistic about 
resentment. On the one hand, resentment attests to the inevitable 
coexistence of two ‘competing desires’. A model that ‘shows his disciple the 
gate of paradise and forbids him (sic) to enter with one and the same 
gesture’14 is inevitably one towards whom the disciple will feel resentful and 
ambivalent. Resentment is a sign of love and hate for the same model – 
truly, an ambivalent state. Girard famously took issue with the Freudian 
category of ambivalence precisely because it was judged unable to show 
that this coexistence of opposites was not an individual pathology, but the 
necessary consequence of the workings of mimetic desire.15 Resentment 
also condemns imitators to a form of masochism, or pseudo-masochism, in 
that ‘masochists cannot find their self-esteem except by a brilliant victory 
over the one who offended them’ which, however, never comes because of 
the power and status differential.16 The imitator obsessed by their model, 
then, is ‘like a moth drawn to the flame that consumes it’.17
Throughout his work, Girard looked at a number of novelists and 
philosophers to disclose and dissect the features of resentment as a 
mimetic affect. Amongst the philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche and Max 
Scheler stand out as his main reference points.18 According to Girard, 
Nietzsche is not only the most important thinkers of modernity but the 
philosopher that more than anyone else gave a definition and meaning to 
this affect – indeed, he gave it a name, and that name is ressentiment. In 
his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes of ressentiment as the affect of 
the weak, of the reactive, of the ‘slaves’, which he associates with 
Christianity. ‘Ressentiment is the interiorization of weakened vengeance’ 
that ‘slaves’ feel towards their ‘masters’.19 Ressentiment is suspended, 
delayed, or botched revenge. As a frustrated, ossified, and ultimately 
generalised form of resentment, ressentiment plants itself in the psychic 
underground of the weak as a blunt arrow, kept in permanent tension by 
the pain or memory of humiliation, yet never released from the bow of 
desire. From there, it poisons the mind of those who suffer from it – like a 
wave on a rock, in a movement that blurs past and present, ressentiment 
recalls the injuries suffered; resentment, unconsummated and thus 
intensified, bounces back as re-ssentiment. However, if Nietzsche is the 
philosopher that gives ressentiment a name, Max Scheler is the author who 
according to Girard uncovers the origins of ressentiment. In Max Scheler’s 
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the envy that derives from comparing oneself to a model, desiring what the 
model has or is, and resenting one’s inferiority. ‘Envy […] is the strongest 
source of ressentiment. It is as if it whispers continually: “I can forgive 
everything, but not that you are – that you are what you are – that I am not 
what you are – indeed that I am not you”’.20 
Although Nietzsche and Scheler are correct in identifying the origins and 
workings of ressentiment, Girard considers them wrong in treating this 
emotion as an individual, anthropological characteristic of a certain class of 
people – a disease exclusive to the ‘slaves’, the weak and the powerless. 
Rather than an individual affect or a psychological trait, in Girard’s writings 
ressentiment is conceptualised as a relational and mimetic passion.21 What 
Nietzsche and Scheler do not understand, according to Girard, is that 
ressentiment is the consequence not of an ill-will, but of how desire works. 
The fact that we imitate the desire of others makes us all ipso facto 
powerless and weak in relation to our models, whom we come to both 
admire and detest, even to the point where their resistance to our 
admiration turns us into spiteful and tormented beings. This is not an 
essential characteristic of certain people, but a modality of our mimetic, 
common human condition. 
Further, although this modality is arguably trans-historical, it could be 
maintained that (late) modernity has made it particularly central to our 
society and way of life. As Stefano Tomelleri illustrates, ‘a genealogy of 
ressentiment informed by the mimetic studies of Girard concentrates its 
attention on the image of this emotion as a social configuration that arises 
from envy and is consolidated in modern democratic institutions, […] where 
the equality that is proclaimed at the level of values contrasts with striking 
inequalities of power and access to material resources’.22 Rivalry and envy, 
in other words, already normally present in human relations given their 
inevitably mimetic nature, seem to have escalated out of proportion in late 
modernity. The triumph of the very operating principles of liberal and 
capitalist societies – namely, equality and the market, and their competitive 
effects – are now amplified on a global scale. Further, immanence and the 
loss of any transcendental points of reference consign humanity to give up 
its normative horizons, and to live and fight its battles mimetically, which 
means violently. Both principles operate on, and multiply, the occasions for 
comparisons and envy. This is escalated by the fact that the promise of 
equality and wealth is frustrated by the reality of inequality and the 
structural imbalances that are often simply denied by society. As Girard 
himself states, ‘we live in a world where many people, rightly or wrongly, 
feel blocked, or paralyzed, in all aspirations, obstructed from achieving their 
most legitimate goals. Individual psychology inevitably ends up resenting 
this permanent frustration, and the need arises for a term that expresses 
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role’.23 
However, at this stage it is worth pausing to question some of the 
conclusions that mimetic theorists reach regarding the relationship between 
desire, imitation and resentment. Are all our resentments merely 
expressions of ressentiment? Do our resentments always and necessarily 
stem from envy? And are our modern societies full of ressentiment, or of 
resentment, or both – and does it matter to be able to discern the difference 
between the two? In the next section I will attempt to answer these 
questions and in so doing offer an alternative reading of the sentiment of 
resentment.
Resentment: an anti-mimetic account
There is another story to tell about resentment. A tradition in modern 
Western political thought has given resentment a virtuous face when 
understood as a moral feeling that derives from the sense of being unfairly 
treated. In its positive incarnation, resentment has been understood as the 
guardian of justice.24 As a moral emotion, resentment is not only an 
appropriate individual response to failures of justice, but it is also an 
indispensable attitude to cultivate if an overall degree of fairness is to be 
maintained in society. The 18th century Presbyterian theologian, Joseph 
Butler, considered resentment as an indispensable social bond holding 
society together, a ‘weapon’ whose function is to ‘to prevent and remedy 
[…] injury, and the miseries arising from it’.25 Considering this sentiment in 
the context of other moral virtues, such as charity and compassion, Butler 
concluded that resentment is needed precisely to allow injustices to be 
acknowledged and injuries to be punished, rather than merely forgiven or 
forgotten. In some circumstances, therefore, resentment is morally superior 
even to charity. 
Although acknowledging its potentially beastly character, unsocial nature, 
and violent potential, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith 
painted a similarly positive picture of resentment. According to Smith, 
resentment functions as a necessary corrective to imbalances in justice, 
and as the reparative mechanism which restores society to a state of 
harmony and fairness.26 Once restrained and tempered of any of its 
excesses, resentment becomes that ‘noble and generous’ feeling of 
indignation that inspires the sympathetic recognition of others, and 
transforms a community of strangers into a community of moral agents 
bound by the same nomos.
The contemporary political philosophy of scholars such as John Rawls, 
Jeffrie Murphy, Margaret Walker, and Robert Solomon follows on from 
these arguments, combining the insights from Adam Smith with a revived 
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affects.27 In A Theory of Justice John Rawls considers resentment as both 
different from and more important than anger, as a political and moral 
emotion. While anger can arise independently of situations of injustice, 
resentment always invokes a concept of right and the existence of a moral 
grievance. While we may feel indignation towards the wrongs we perceive 
to have been done to others, resentment concerns wrongs that we perceive 
as our own because they are directed at us.28 
Futher, Robert Solomon goes as far as to assert that, as ‘a passion for 
justice denied […], resentment lies at the heart of democracy’.29 It is the 
emotional state which, more than any other sentiment, proves that we care 
about and are ‘committed to certain moral standards, as regulative of social 
life’.30 Distancing himself from the Nietzschean concept of ressentiment, 
Solomon argues that ‘what Nietzsche ignores, partly because of his own 
sense of biological determinism […] is the legitimacy of the felt need to 
change the world. The sentiment of resentment may often be a legitimate 
sense of oppression. It is not the voice of mediocrity or incompetence but 
the passion for justice denied’.31 What is judged to be detrimental if not 
wholly questionable, therefore, is thus not the place of resentment within 
the moral order – rather, it is the absence of resentment in the face of 
injustice that should be denounced as immoral. As Jean Améry stated, 
there is virtue in the moral ‘vertigo’ of resentment that disrupts the moral 
order and prevents hasty attempts at reconciliation. It is only because of 
resentment that injustices become ‘a moral reality’ and it is only through 
resentment that an entire community, including perpetrators of injustice, are 
‘swept into the truth’.32
In the context of the recent ‘affective turn’ in social and political theory, an 
acknowledgement has gradually formed according to which, rather than 
being enemies of political causes, negative emotions play a fundamental 
role in politics. Thus, for instance, anger has been recently rediscovered as 
‘the essential political emotion’. Drawing on the classical Aristotelian view of 
anger as useful and justifiable affect, a number of scholars have thus urged 
to reinstate its moral and political value. Similarly, scholars such as Michael 
Ure have demonstrated how resentment, rather than, ressentiment, can 
function as ‘one of democracy’s emotional pillars’, when it incorporates the 
democratic commitment to equal respect, with resentment being an 
important emotion for identifying and addressing collective and systematic 
injustices.33
William Connolly’s writings on the politics of resentment are also an 
interesting case in point. While Connolly acknowledges that resentment 
and moral indignation are ‘indispensable sources of energy and inspiration’ 
for the formation of new political subjects and social movements, he warns 
about the exclusions and excesses spawned in the process. Identity 
politics, in particular, is also always potentially a politics of resentment, that 
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Connolly, however, ressentiment is altogether ‘another matter’.35 Connolly, 
in particular, recognises two routes into ressentiment. The first does rely on 
a Nietzschean reading of ressentiment, but the second route into 
ressentiment, however, is moral and political – and highlights the transition, 
rather than the opposition, between resentment and ressentiment. 
‘Ressentiment is stored resentment that has poisoned the soul and 
migrated to places where it is hidden and denied’,36 ‘it can grow out of an 
accumulation of justified resentments’ and can get dangerously congealed 
and ‘encoded into the spirit of institutional life’, endangering pluralism.37 
Thus, not all forms of ressentiment are without political or moral bases.
The account of resentment that this literature presents is starkly different 
from the much less positive understanding of resentment to which many 
scholars, including Girard, subscribe. This is due to the hegemony 
exercised by the Nietzschean reading of resentment already illustrated 
above. Be that as it may, it is striking that Girard never engages in as 
thorough a discussion of resentment as he does of ressentiment. Girard 
focuses so much on the latter that the former does not figure at all as an 
emotion. What is missing, in other words, is an account of how legitimate 
grievances may emerge as something other than the mere operations of 
envy and mimetic rivalry, but as a result of wounding, injustices and the felt 
need to remedy wrongs. The next section will investigate why this is the 
case and why this matters.
What’s in a name – on the value of resentment and the perils of 
ressentiment 
As illustrated in the paragraphs above, resentment is an ambiguous 
emotion. This ambiguity is well encapsulated in the slight literal variation 
which separates the two terms commonly used to refer to it: resentment 
and ressentiment. This emotion has been given both a virtuous face, when 
it indicates a legitimate response to a perceived injustice, and vicious 
features, when it is engorged with metaphysical envy and narcissistic rage. 
Interestingly, mimetic theory has tended to subsume or fold the former into 
the latter, discussing resentment predominantly, if not uniquely, as 
ressentiment. Other scholars and theorists have maintained the difference 
between the two, although some have also posited a continuum along 
which this emotion slides and morphs, changing features as it travels along. 
What’s at stake in differentiating resentment and ressentiment? And what 
does this exercise tell us about mimetic theory as a social and political 
theory?
Girard understands resentment as being the consequence of mimesis. 
Given that our desires are always the desires of an Other, and given that 
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and necessarily envious of what the Other has or is. Envy makes us 
resentful and, as Girard states in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Max 
Scheler’s notion of ressentiment describes this feelings most accurately.38 
Seen from the point of view of the literature reviewed in the section above, 
however, resentment seems to have nothing to do with envy. It is rather a 
moral emotion most frequently associated with the perception of an 
injustice, the felt sense of having been wronged, or of some normative 
standard having been broken. 
A closer inspection reveals that resentment and ressentiment presuppose 
different configurations the entanglements between self and other. 
Ressentiment is a mimetic sentiment in so far as it starts by looking outside 
of oneself, by incessantly comparing oneself to the other during the 
encounter with the other, desiring and demanding identity. When the 
comparison leaves the subject wanting, suffering is interpreted as a proof of 
virtue, rather than of responsibility, of the imitator. Thus, blame falls on the 
Other and revenge becomes the only possible response. A new identity is 
formed, which will however be inevitably other-directed and bear the scars 
of its original exclusion. Resentment, on the other hand, is an anti-mimetic 
emotion in so far as it starts from self-affirmation and dis-identification; it 
presupposes a clear sense of one’s identity and worth, quite aside from 
whatever may be mobilised in the encounter with the other. The person 
who expresses their resentments names themselves and affirms their 
worth. Resentment starts from the acknowledgement of difference between 
self and other, and of a certain distance within the relation that caused 
injury or loss.39
Resentment and ressentiment also differs in terms of the kinds of 
behaviours they engender. Ressentiment tends to consign the subject 
experiencing it to a form of petty, or violent, backbiting – an alienating and 
non-emancipatory behaviour that, as Gilles Deleuze argued, ‘decomposes 
resistance and incapacitates contestation’.40 Since enjoyment comes more 
from the misfortunes of others than an increase in one’s well-being, 
imposing one’s suffering on others through revenge becomes a way of 
actualising one’s negative enjoyment.41 Resentment, on the other hand, is 
unconcerned about relative gains or losses as it is not caught in the 
mimetic tit-for-tat. Resentment aims at achieving adequate and 
emancipatory, i.e., self-affirming, responses to injury that acknowledge 
one’s responsibility in the relation but look beyond the horizon of the 
specific encounter towards a shared nomos.
Moreover, resentment and ressentiment yield different epistemic insights 
and ‘intelligence’ about the wider political and social order in which they 
emerge.42 Ressentiment presupposes and upholds a negative view of 
equality which it interprets merely as an envy-inducing competition over 
status. This is, after all, the anti-democratic, élitist prejudice that moved 
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both Scheler and Nietzsche to condemn the French Revolution as a 
product of ressentiment, among other things.43 Only clear hierarchies and 
order, it is believed, can contain ressentiment which otherwise, if left 
unchecked, is bound to lead to forms of violent reciprocity (to use Girard’s 
terminology), including scapegoating. Resentment, on the other hand, 
welcomes equality and is suspicious of imposed hierarchies because 
always already steeped in violence and inequality. Resentment takes 
democracy seriously by appealing to and re-affirming shared norms of 
justice. Interestingly, if one reads the particular climate of today against the 
different emotional lenses of ressentiment and resentment, different 
epistemic insights are allowed to emerge. While ressentiment would lead 
us to believe that today’s widespread frustration and anger due to envy and 
narcissism, or to a relentless search for recognition and status, reading the 
same material through resentment would allow us to see how the current 
wave of negative emotions has perhaps more to do with the way in which 
individuals have been failed by a number of global processes. As Zygmunt 
Bauman has so brilliantly illustrated, in today’s world risk society, the 
individual condition is one of extreme vulnerability to the systemic failures 
of globalisation, and yet one in which the individual bears full responsibility 
for their costs.44 This necessarily creates the conditions for progressively 
alienated, frustrated and resentful individuals – though this resentment can 
hardly be dismissed as ressentiment.45 
Lastly, the value of these emotions seems to be differ radically. In the 
literature influenced by the Nietzschean reading of resentment, 
ressentiment is viewed as a ‘bad’, counter-productive and pernicious 
emotion which is patronizingly dismissed as belonging to ‘disempowered’, 
weak subjects – in the case of Nietzsche, Christians; in the case of Girard, 
the ‘puppets’ of desire, namely all human beings caught in endless mimetic 
entanglements. Paradoxically, this judgement has the effect of rendering 
the recognition of injustice more difficult, or precluding it altogether, not 
least because of the ‘bad’ emotions that come attached to it. Resentment, 
on the other hand, holds a positive view of human nature as well as of 
negative emotions. Resentment paints a landscape in which human beings 
are able to perceive wrongs as something other than the operations of 
envy; but also, it considers possible to redress such wrongs by pursuing 
emancipatory strategies fuelled by a perhaps uncomfortable yet useful 
emotion.
Given the differences between the two affects and the starkly juxtaposed 
moral universes these emotions sketch, it is inevitable in conclusion to ask 
the following question: is the conflation of resentment and ressentiment in 
mimetic theory merely accidental? I do not think so. On the contrary, I 
would argue that rather than accidental, this conflation is entirely deliberate 
and that it is guided by a specific view of politics and human nature. Briefly 
put, the conflation of resentment and ressentiment, in Girard, functions as 
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the latter because it ties in with the idea of a subject completely 
disempowered and at the mercy of desires that are other-directed. In 
demonstrating the power of mimesis, however, Girard disempowers human 
beings. 
Firstly, within the horizon of mimetic theory, it is impossible to feel resentful 
without being drawn into the vortex of ressentiment. This precludes the 
possibility for human beings of consciously cultivating affirmative 
sentiments of resentment. How does one feel injustice in mimetic theory, if 
there is no name for it? While this may be a healthy warning against, inter 
alia, the naïve aspects of the equality agenda, or the excesses of the 
politics of identity, it is a position which is manifestly reductive of the human 
experience. One only needs to think about the American civil rights 
movement led by Martin Luther King to understand how inappropriate and 
ideological it would be to apply the category of ressentiment here – and 
how central, on the other hand, ‘virtuous’ forms resentment were to its 
development and struggle. Secondly, the deliberate foregrounding of 
ressentiment over resentment has the aim of dismissing human beings as 
non-political beings. Rather patronizingly, if not contemptuously, mimetic 
theory contemplates us only within the ever escalating squabbles of the 
petty, envy-generated tit-for-tat of ressentiment. The prejudice against any 
demands for justice, democracy and equality, for which resentment can 
function as a vehicle, is certainly reminiscent of both Scheler’s and 
Nietzsche’s own conservative and anti-democratic outlook – with the only 
difference that Girard considers us as ‘slaves’ to our desire, rather than to 
any specific religious tradition.
In fact, and in the last analysis, it is quite telling that of the two philosophers 
singled out for their treatment of ressentiment, Girard seems to give 
preference to Scheler’s account. As Wolfgang Palaver noted, ‘of all the 
modern thinkers who offer reflections on the mimetic passions of vanity, 
pride, and envy, Girard focuses most extensively on Max Scheler’.46 
Interestingly, although raging against ressentiment, Nietzsche did 
recognise the moral value of resentment. According to Nietzsche, one can 
experience resentment outside an economy of pure envy by adopting 
active ‘ripostes’ against the disempowering tendencies of ressentiment. As 
argued by Grace Hunt, laughter, gratitude or even seeking revenge are 
healthy modalities of enacted resentment that Nietzsche contemplates as 
ways out of the repressed vengefulness leading to spiral of ressentiment.47 
Far from indicating the collapse of life, Nietzsche’s 
resentment/ressentiment in fact points to the potentiality of a tremendous, 
life-generating energy source.48 The emotion that Scheler describes, on the 
other hand, seems to be of a much more mundane kind – often gendered 
and ridiculed, petty and static, Scheler’s treatment of ressentiment amounts 
to a polemic rather than a metaphysics, with little to no emancipatory 
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potential. In embracing this reductive notion of resentment, however, 
mimetic theory not only ties its cart to a deeply conservative vision of social 
order, but it deprives us of the capacity to feel a broader spectrum of 
sentiments, while ultimately arguing against the possibility of cultivating and 
pursuing justice on earth, rather than surrendering it to a transcendental 
sphere.
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